There is intense competition between managed care organizations (MCOs) in the USA based on cost and benefit coverage, but scant attention to differences in quality. Consumer preference for 'choice' has stimulated the growth of overlapping networks of providers across competing MCOs. These networks have tended to perform less well on the quality indicators in report cards than staff model MCOs. Ideally one would measure individual provider performance; but the overlapping networks, and the fact that each MCO represents a small fraction of each provider's practice, make that difficult to do. MCOs could potentially collaborate to measure individual provider performance. Financial incentives and risk-adjusted premiums might stimulate competition on quality within MCOs. It seems more likely that true competition on quality will occur between groups of providers, organized or integrated delivery systems, than between MCOs. Nevertheless, MCOs are likely to offer some quality-improving programs directly to their members, and can stimulate the competition between providers by collaborating to obtain provider-specific measurements.
Health Plan Employer Data and
company in a competitive market may be interested in 'buying business' and will offer an exceptionally low price to an Information Set employer-purchaser. Other competitors may follow suit in an attempt to retain the employer as a customer. This leads Despite the general trend, some employers have demonstrated to a price war; and local price wars have been common, as an interest in technical aspects of quality of care. These have might be expected in a highly competitive market.
tended to be large employers; and several years ago a few of Unfortunately, while many employers say that assuring them joined together with an organization called the HMO quality is very important in health plan selection [1] , relatively Group to develop the collection of measures of managed few employers act as if they believe there are differences in care organization (MCO) performance called HEDIS (Health quality between managed care plans. Fewer still appear willing Plan Employer Data and Information Set). The HEDIS to pay a premium for higher quality. To a great extent, the measures were designed to encompass several domains of employers who are driving the competition on cost and MCO performance, including quality, access and satisfaction, coverage, appear to reflect the views of their employees about membership and utilization, and finance [2] . The initial instrument, HEDIS 1.0, was never used for cross-MCO quality. Population surveys indicate that the American public measurement. It did become the basis for additional work number of MCOs in an area and the more competitive the marketplace, the smaller the proportion of any single by the employers and a more diverse group of MCOs to develop a more robust cross-MCO measurement tool. The physician's practice that is likely to consist of members of a specific MCO. We shall discuss the implications of this work on the instrument was performed under the auspices of the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), organizational structure of overlapping delivery systems below. an accrediting body for MCOs in the USA. The resulting HEDIS 2.0, 2.5, and more recently 3.0 measurement sets, Staff model HMOs (in which the physicians are employed directly by an MCO) or group model HMOs (in which the have been used by MCOs who have provided information on their performance on these HEDIS measures to individual physicians are in an independently incorporated group which has an exclusive contractual arrangement with an MCO) employers and to regional HEDIS coalitions. These regional account for a small proportion of the MCOs in the USA. the staff model components of the organization have con-HEDIS has tried to determine which measurements of MCO sistently had higher scores than the network. performance would be most important to know. Since these One factor which probably contributes to these results is indicators have not necessarily been measured, or measured that staff/group model MCOs were the original HMOs, or widely, the latest versions of HEDIS include some test health maintenance organizations. They took the notion of measures − measures which are being refined for possible prevention seriously. Their benefits included coverage for widespread use.
preventive services long before most insurance plans were Despite the fact that report cards have made available accepted by individual physicians. Several of the HEDIS important measurements of MCO performance, these measquality indicators measure preventive services, e.g. childhood urements usually do not reach the level of the individual immunization, screening for breast and cervical cancer, and provider. Many employers are now adopting the position of diabetic retinal examination, and so it is not surprising that consumers in that they see the individual provider or medical the staff/group model MCOs have, on average, performed group as the locus for quality. They would like to see providerbetter on these indicators. In addition, staff/group model based measures of performance and to be assured that plan MCOs are more cohesive organizations than network model networks include a broad representation of high quality MCOs. They truly are an organized delivery system. It is providers. This would put in the hands of the consumers relatively easy to implement quality management programs the responsibility to act on provider-based performance measwithin these group practices; and this probably explains why ures in choosing their physician, hospital, etc. and would their better performance is not entirely limited to imbe a desirable response to the public's wants and needs. munization or screening of healthy persons but extends to Unfortunately, the paucity of publicly available, reliable meassome groups of patients with chronic conditions, such as ures of provider performance, makes it an as yet unattained asthmatics, for whom programs have been developed which objective.
result in fewer emergency room visits and hospital admissions. Network size and the degree of penetration of a physician's practice by an MCO are potentially related to the ability of
Relationships between network
that MCO to manage technical aspects of quality of care. In characteristics and quality general, the more physicians the MCO has to deal with, the more difficult it is to implement an intervention designed to In most urban managed care markets, the importance of improve quality. In part, this is due to the sheer numbers of choice to the consumer has led to the proliferation of network physicians who must be kept informed or actually participate model managed care organizations. These organizations con-in the quality improvement effort. In part, it is due to the tract with large numbers of physicians, so that there is a high low penetration of practices in large networks, the inability probability that each consumer's physician is included in the to attract the attention of the physician to a particular MCO's network. Obviously, when there is more than one network effort to improve quality, and the lack of consistency in the messages and methods used by the MCOs. model MCO in the market area, each MCO is going to try to sign up the same physicians. The physicians, who are For example, to improve the immunization status of children aged 2 years in a staff model group practice, the usually not bound exclusively to any one MCO, are going to have contracts with several MCOs. Thus, the larger the MCO has many tools at its fingertips. It can generate lists of children who are 18 months of age, distribute them to improvement, it is not surprising that in order to stimulate competition among MCOs on quality, it was a necessary first the medical assistants in its pediatric or family practices, instruct them on how to review the medical record to ascertain step to get collaboration between them to provide information about quality indicators, e.g. the development and imwhether the child has been fully immunized, and provide them with explicit instructions on how to do outreach to the plementation of HEDIS. But, purchasers or regulators might consider fostering further and more extensive collaboration. families of children who are missing one or more recommended immunizations. In some instances it can go For instance, despite the fact that measurement of individual physician performance is highly desirable, it is difficult and further, by linking automated reminders to its clinical information systems; e.g. appointment systems, or even com-expensive. Furthermore, if an MCO has as its members only a small percentage of a physician's practice, then there are puterized medical records systems. The staff model MCO likely to be very small numbers of persons meeting the has enormous control of the processes and the personnel, requirement for inclusion in the denominator of the measure. who are its employees. In contrast, in a network, an MCO The MCO has no legal basis for obtaining information on could generate lists of 18 month old children and distribute the persons in the practice who are not its members. Thus, them to the physicians; but they would represent only a to bring measurement down to the individual practice level, fraction of the physicians' practices. The MCO could offer it is important to consider collaboration. training sessions to the physicians' office staff; but as neither It is likely that in the future third party measurers will the physician nor the staff members are employees, they are evaluate quality indicators in individual practices, either by not likely to come to the training without some incentive going to those practices directly on behalf of several MCOs (possibly financial). The MCO could also give advice to the and reviewing records or by analyzing pooled administrative physicians and their office staff on how to set up better data from several MCOs. The overall results could be returned reminder and outreach systems in their offices; but once to each MCO, which then would have several options for again the MCO has little control over implementation or working to improve quality − individually or collectively. maintenance of these systems.
Currently there are attempts to do this in Minnesota and Although quality indicator measurements such as the California, and the effort is beginning to be organized in HEDIS results usually favor staff/group model MCOs, surIowa and Massachusetts. One potential problem with this veys of members and employers usually show that they rate approach is legislation in Minnesota which requires that the network model MCOs higher on 'quality of care'. As stated individual person give explicit informed consent to providing above, it is likely that these higher ratings for network model each item of information to the third-party measurer when MCOs reflect their greater choice of physician and a different the measurement can be considered to be research [4] . Thus interpretation of quality of care by the general public vs.
far, consent has been obtained from only a small percentage health care professionals.
of Minnesota residents from whom it has been requested. Should this continue to be the case and should such legislation become commonplace, it would severely hamper efforts
Implications of overlapping physician
to develop new or better measures of individual provider networks performance. The public, in its fear of breaches in confidentiality of the data, would deny itself the information on Another issue which arises when there are several competing individual providers necessary for making informed choices. MCOs in a market area with essentially the same network of A variation of the approach of pooling information is physicians, is whether they truly can differ in quality? Most occurring currently in Massachusetts. Through the Masmedical care is determined or delivered by a clinician working sachusetts Health Quality Partnership, four major MCOs, with the patient behind a closed office door, and it is likely the agency which provides medical benefits to the State's that the same decisions will be made by the physician for welfare population, and other key stakeholders, have joined members of competing MCOs. Accordingly, to the extent forces to encourage acute care hospitals to participate in that the networks of competing MCOs overlap, one would measuring patient experiences. They are using standardized expect similar processes, outcomes and scores for the MCOs tools developed by the Picker Institute and the Maryland in the area. National HEDIS data demonstrate regional Quality Indicator Project. Their ultimate objective is to endifferences in average scores on quality indicators, and within courage each hospital to focus improvement efforts on its some regions (such as New England and the Pacific) where top priority areas. The same collaborators are now considering there is a lot of overlap of the networks, there is clustering involving nursing homes in a similar initiative. of the scores around the regional average.
Interestingly, in many states, there has been legislation How can one encourage improved levels of performance, requiring MCOs to accept into its network any willing provider either by an MCO or across a region with multiple MCOs? who meets a set of criteria that the MCO must predetermine. One way might be to encourage collaboration rather than Arguments that such a practice would make it more difficult for the MCO to manage quality of care have had little competition among the MCOs. Purchasers or regulators, who deal with multiple MCOs, might convene the MCOs and acceptance among legislators. One can wonder whether many colleges or medical schools would be able to function, or inspire them to work together to improve quality. Since measurement is a critical component and driver of quality function at their current level of quality, if they had to accept any applicant who met a predetermined criteria set. It is well What may be less obvious is that there is also reluctance on the part of MCOs to undertake quality improvement efforts known that many excellent institutions have many more qualified applicants than they can accept if the character of which do have long-term, but not short-term, returns on investment. For-profit MCOs have to keep an eye on the the institution is to be maintained.
So, one can wonder what strategies are available to an quarterly financial statements, and even not-for-profit MCOs have to keep an eye on the annual financial statements. In MCO or group of MCOs who have a competitive drive to improve quality but have also chosen to have, or must include, the highly cost-competitive environment that currently exists in the USA, it is difficult for any MCO to budget a substantial any willing provider? One possibility is for the MCO to work directly with its members. This has two effects: First, although expenditure for a quality enhancing program that will not begin to yield returns until the second or third year. the MCO is likely to inform the physician of its plans and Another deterrent to competition for improvement of actions, the MCO will not need each individual physician to quality of care is the fear of adverse selection. Health insurance cooperate actively in reaching the member. Secondly, to the premiums are, at best, crudely adjusted for health risk. Thus, extent that one MCO has a program of outreach to its the MCO that develops an outstanding program for the members and others do not, it may be able to establish a management of HIV disease is likely to attract a high risk competitive advantage. population for which it will receive average premiums. Not Some examples of this approach are in order. A simple surprisingly, when capitated Medicare programs began to one is that to stimulate mammography screening an MCO proliferate in MCOs, stories began to circulate through the can identify women in the recommended age bracket from industry about how various MCOs were attempting to attract its enrollment files. Then, from its claims database, it can low risk populations, i.e. the healthy elderly. Recently, the determine which women have not had a test within the United States Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), recommended screening period and generate a direct inwhich runs the Medicare program, has been examining ways vitation to the member to be screened. It can even direct to risk-adjust premium payments to MCOs. This would, if the location of the screening, which may improve its cost well done, take away the disincentive that currently exists for competitiveness. Using this approach, Harvard Pilgrim Health MCOs to attract the frail elderly and should lead MCOs to Care has achieved a mammography screening rate in its develop programs for providing more effective care for these network which is slightly higher than that of its staff/group chronically ill persons. models. Another, more complex example, is that instead of A less obvious, but real, deterrent to improvement of trying to get each network physician to develop standardized quality by MCOs is that the standard financial arrangements treatment plans for asthmatic members, the MCO can set between physicians and MCOs do not support a significant up a centralized asthma management program. Using its volume of quality improvement activities. Physicians are used claims database, the MCO can identify asthmatics. It can to one of two basic compensation schemes from MCOs − have a nurse clinician contact the member and offer one-oneither capitation or discounted fee-for-service, the latter of one counseling. It can advise the member on when it is which is much more common. An MCO which is both trying appropriate to see the physician for further evaluation or to control/compete on costs and give a physician an incentive treatment; it can offer the member an opportunity to attend to improve quality would have to reserve some portion of a group teaching sessions; and, it can provide information back physicians expected level of compensation and pay it out on to the individual physician on what it has done with the the basis of quality-related performance. The physician is member. If devised carefully, ideally with input from practicing unlikely to favor such an arrangement, and the MCOs which physician's, such programs can be seen as an aid to the did not hold back any of the expected compensation would physician rather than meddling by the MCO. Thus, in the have a competitive advantage with the physician. Conversely, absence of collaboration among MCOs, an individual MCO the MCO which offers the physician a bonus above expected can develop programs which are designed to improve quality compensation on the basis of quality-related performance of care for the member and carry the brand of the MCO.
would be likely to have a higher cost structure than those MCOs which did not offer the bonus. Its premiums would be higher than its competitors, and it would have a dis-
Deterrents to competition for quality
advantage in a competitive marketplace primarily driven by among MCOs premium cost.
Although it may be a bit easier to build in financial There are a number of deterrents to competition for im-incentives related to quality in capitation arrangements than provement of quality of care among MCOs.
in discounted fee-for-service payments, all of these schemes Kerr et al. [5] have shown that capitated physician groups suffer from two problems: first, the amount of money are most likely to work on quality improvement projects/ involved usually is small, especially if only a small percentage processes that also decrease cost. This is hardly surprising in of the physician's overall practice consists of members of a single MCO; secondly, financial incentives usually have to be a cost-driven industry and is likely to apply to MCOs and not only to capitated physician groups. In the current en-tied to specific performance indicators. The greater the number of indicators one wants to improve, the more money vironment, if a quality improvement project is likely to increase costs, it is not likely to be undertaken voluntarily. that has to be allocated; or if the total amount of money is kept constant, the less the incentive for improving any single themselves from others with similar networks, might try to distinguish certain parts of their networks in the minds of indicator.
their customers. Up to now MCOs have not made significant efforts to enhance the public's knowledge of differences between component delivery systems within their networks.
Current state of quality in managed care Indeed, they usually try to present themselves as a homoand outlook for the future geneous entity or single delivery system, rather than the heterogeneous entities they actually are. In contrast, in the There have been a number of studies over the years comparing Minneapolis marketplace, one MCO has been trying to portray the performance of MCOs with indemnity insurance/fee-itself as an agent which offers a portfolio of delivery systems for-service care. These have been compiled and summarized with different price and quality attributes. In short, the MCO in two time periods by Miller and Luft [6, 7] . The results are is stimulating internal competition on price and quality among mixed. In their analysis of literature published between 1980 its component delivery systems. It is not yet certain that this and 1994, the results for MCOs were better than or equal effort will succeed or become a model for other MCOs. to the results for fee-for-service plans on 14 out of 17 quality Will MCOs in the future compete voluntarily on quality of care measures [6] . In their review of studies published in a serious way? MCOs certainly could be a significant force between late 1993 and early 1997 [7] , Miller and Luft found for improvement of quality of care either directly, or by approximately equal numbers showing better and poorer stimulating improved quality from the delivery systems with results for MCOs. They also found several studies in which which they contract. Whether MCOs will actually do so elderly MCO members with chronic conditions appeared to depends on whether the general public becomes engaged fare less well. They attributed the lack of improved overall with the following ideas: (i) quality of care is not just about quality among MCO members to 'slow clinical practice choice of provider; (ii) quality of care can be improved over change, lack of risk-adjusted capitation rates, and inadequate its present state; and (iii) MCOs can play a significant role quality measurement and reporting'.
in improving quality of care. Right now, the public appears Recognizing that the health care marketplace in the USA, to be uninterested in aspects of quality other than choice, rightly or not, has been shaped by concerns about cost not and the public has definitely not been impressed by quality quality, it is less important what MCOs have done in the indicators such as HEDIS. The public may think that quality past about quality than what they might do in the future. needs to be improved because it seems to believe, erroneously, Several possibilities are open. As we have previously noted, that quality of care used to be better than it is today [8]. HCFA, a major purchaser of care, is working on risk-adjusted There is little evidence, however, that the public believes that capitation methodologies, which addresses one of Miller MCOs are likely to improve care or are even capable of and Luft's concerns. Collaboration among MCOs, probably doing so. Indeed, for those interested in technical aspects of promoted by purchasers or regulators, could lead to pro-quality of care, the marketplace seems perverse, because the gressive improvement of quality measurement and reporting. public has driven it towards the overlapping networks which Some observers of managed care in the USA believe that are the most difficult environment in which to improve local markets will move towards the emergence of a few quality. highly integrated delivery systems which will compete against Finally, there is the possibility, as always, that the market each other on quality. Though a few markets, e.g. Al-is not perverse, but right. Cost has been a major problem buquerque, New Mexico, have developed along these lines, for health care in the USA, and the trend in health care we doubt that most markets that currently consist of broad, delivery there over the past several years has been towards overlapping networks will become so differentiated. What a more cost-efficient system which still preserves what the seems more plausible is that MCOs having extensive over-public appears to value most − choice. Perhaps it is too lapping networks will, if cost and coverage become relatively much to expect that competition among MCOs, in addition standardized, try to avoid being perceived as commodities to managing cost, will be the principal mechanism for manby competing primarily on service to members and purchasers. aging and improving quality of care. The public does not There is also an opportunity for MCOs to compete in the perceive the MCO as the principal locus for managing quality. future on the basis of a few branded quality programs. Rather it sees the provider as the locus. That idea is correct. Theoretically, these programs could be directed by the MCO Individual providers and organized groups of providers have towards network providers and could be designed to win the more direct control over quality of care than do MCOs. loyalty of these providers. It is debatable, however, whether As noted before, provider level quality measures would be an MCO could win sufficient loyalty because of its service an important response to the public's perceptions and needs. or quality programs for providers to overcome a differential These measures can either be developed through collaboration in payment to providers. Thus, the MCO which tries to win of network MCOs or by the organized/integrated delivery provider loyalty with programs must also be extremely cost systems that are likely to make up the overlapping networks of the future. If these delivery systems continue to have an efficient. Branded quality programs, such as the asthma example above, are more likely to be targeted by the MCO excess supply of providers, the providers will be stimulated to compete with each other, not by the MCOs per se, but by directly to the member.
It is possible that MCOs, in an attempt to differentiate their own need to attract patients within the MCOs. As the
